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Pharmaceutical  policy  makers  are  increasingly  negotiating  reimbursement  contracts  that
include  conﬁdential  price  terms  that  may  be  affected  by  drug  utilization  volumes,  patterns,
or outcomes.  Though  such  contracts  may  offer  a variety  of  beneﬁts,  including  the  ability
to  tie  payment  to the  actual  performance  of  a  product,  they  may  also  create  potential  pol-
icy challenges.  Through  telephone  interviews  about  this  type  of  contract,  we  studied  the
views of  ofﬁcials  in  nine  of ten  Canadian  provinces.  Use  of reimbursement  contracts  involv-
ing conﬁdential  discounts  is  new  in Canada  and  ideas  about  power  and  equity  emerged
as  cross-cutting  themes  in  our  interviews.  Though  conﬁdential  rebates  can  lower  prices
and thereby  increase  coverage  of  new  medicines,  several  policy  makers  felt they  had  little
power in the  decision  to negotiate  rebates.  Study  participants  explained  that  the  recent
rise in  the  use of rebates  had  been  driven  by manufacturers’  pricing  tactics  and prece-
dent  set  by other  jurisdictions.  Several  policy  makers  expressed  concerns  that  conﬁdential
rebates  could  result  in  inter-jurisdictional  inequities  in  drug  pricing  and  coverage.  Policy
makers also  noted  un-insured  and  under-insured  patients  must  pay  inﬂated  “list  prices”
even  if  rebates  are  negotiated  by  drug  plans.  The  establishment  of  policies  for  disciplined
negotiations,  inter-jurisdictional  cooperation,  and  provision  of  drug  coverage  for  all  citi-
zens  are  potential  solutions  to  the  challenges  created  by  this  new  pharmaceutical  pricing
hors. P
paradigm.
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. IntroductionPharmaceutical policy makers are increasingly nego-
iating reimbursement contracts as a condition of drug
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coverage [1–4]. Such contracts come in many forms but
commonly include conﬁdential rebates paid directly from
the manufacturer to the drug plan. These rebates may  be
simple discounts on the list price of medicines or more
complex forms of compensation based on the volume,
appropriateness, or outcomes of medicine use. Though
such contracts may  offer a variety of beneﬁts, including
the ability to tie payment to the actual performance of a
product, they may  also create potential policy challenges.
There has been relatively limited documentation of
payers’ views of reimbursement contracts [5,6]. This is
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.not simply because of the conﬁdentiality of negotiation
outcomes; it also stems from the relative novelty of these
policies in many countries. We  sought to document pol-
icy considerations related to the use of reimbursement
r CC BY-NC-SA license.
S.G. Morgan et al. / Health Policy 112 (2013) 248– 254 249
Table 1
Statistics on Canada’s provinces and territories.
Population (2011) Gross domestic
product per capita
(CAD$, 2010)
Prescription drug
spending per capita
(CAD$, 2011)
Share of prescription drug spending
ﬁnanced by provincial or territorial
governments (2011)
Canada (total) 34,482,779 $47,000 $788 38%
Ontario 13,372,996 $46,000 $785 43%
Quebec 7,979,663 $40,000 $912 33%
British Columbia 4,573,321 $44,000 $575 36%
Alberta 3,779,353 $70,000 $725 45%
Manitoba 1,250,574 $43,000 $710 34%
Saskatchewan 1,057,884 $60,000 $799 38%
Nova Scotia 945,437 $38,000 $985 34%
New Brunswick 755,455 $39,000 $937 26%
Newfoundland and Labrador 510,578 $55,000 $920 32%
Prince Edward Island 145,855 $34,000 $791 31%
Northwest Territoriesa 43,675 $108,000 $587 20%
Yukon (territory)a 34,666 $67,000 $677 38%
Nunavut (territory)a 33,322 $53,000 $573 14%
Sources: Authors’ analysis of data from Canadian Institute for Health Information and Statistics Canada.
a pulatedLess than 1% of Canada’s population lives in Canada’s vast, sparsely po
role;  as such, provinces are the focus of this paper.
contracts in Canada, a federation of heterogeneous
provinces, some of which have begun using reimburse-
ment contracts in recent years. Using data collected from
key informant interviews, we analyze motivations for and
challenges associated with reimbursement contract use in
Canada. Several generalizable lessons emerge regarding
factors that affect the adoption and outcomes of reimburse-
ment contracts for pharmaceuticals.
1.1. Canada’s policy context
Reimbursement contracts in Canada are referred to as
product listing agreements (PLAs). Their use is shaped by
a number of economic, demographic, and institutional fac-
tors. The ﬁrst is that Canadian health care is formally the
responsibility of the ten provinces, which are heteroge-
neous in both population size and income. As shown in
Table 1, provincial populations vary from 145,855 in Prince
Edward Island to 13,372,996 in Ontario; average per capita
incomes vary from CAD$34,000 in Prince Edward Island to
CAD$70,000 in Alberta.
National standards for the provincial health insurance
programs that publicly ﬁnance virtually all costs of medi-
cal and hospital care are maintained by way of signiﬁcant
federal cost-sharing. Federal contributions for qualify-
ing provincial insurance programs include mechanisms
for resolving disparities in provincial GDP such that all
provinces can afford to maintain national standards [7].
Prescription drugs used outside of hospitals are excluded
from this federally-supported ‘medicare’ system. The fed-
eral government only funds prescription drug coverage for
veterans, status Indians, and other speciﬁc populations that
fall under its jurisdiction. This accounts for 2% of total pre-
scription drug costs in Canada.
Provincial governments fund between 31% and 45% of
prescription drug costs in their provinces through drug
beneﬁt programs that vary considerably in terms of eligibil-
ity and cost-sharing requirements [8]. All provinces require
a majority of residents to fund medicines out-of-pocket territories in which Federal drug programs play a particularly important
or through private insurance. In Quebec, all residents are
required to purchase private insurance if they qualify [9].
Private insurance is voluntary in all other provinces and,
as a result, many Canadians are either uninsured or under-
insured for pharmaceutical costs.
All provinces except Quebec participate in a Common
Drug Review (CDR) for appraising new drugs for cover-
age decision-making. Manufacturers that wish to have a
product listed on provincial formularies must submit an
application to the CDR which then appraises evidence and
makes a coverage recommendation [10]. The recommen-
dations from the CDR are just that: recommendations. Final
coverage decisions remain under the authority of each
provincial government. Most provincial drug plans cover
virtually all medicines in high-volume, primary care drug
classes – such antihypertensives, statins, and antidepres-
sants [11]. Provincial drug plans do vary, however, with
respect to the timeliness and extent of coverage for spe-
cialized medicines [12,13].
The prices of medicines in Canada are determined by a
combination of federal regulation and provincial negotia-
tion, the relative importance of which will vary depending
on the product. The federal Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board sets limits on allowable prices based on the
median of list prices found in seven comparator countries:
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States [14]. The province of Que-
bec also requires that manufacturers guarantee private
and public drug plans in Quebec the best available prices
in Canada [15]. Other provinces exert inﬂuences on drug
pricing by way  of negotiations concerning formulary list-
ings; however, in the past, provincial governments seldom
(if ever) negotiated conﬁdential rebates with manufactur-
ers seeking coverage for new medicines [16–18]. Instead,
decision-making by provinces was  historically a function of
simple “yes” or “no” decision-making concerning coverage
of drugs at list prices. Manufacturers thereby had incen-
tive to ensure that the list prices rendered their products
cost-effective in Canada, which often resulted in list prices
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ell within levels permitted by federal regulation [16]. The
esults of our interviews with policy makers suggest that
he pricing paradigm in Canada has changed profoundly in
ecent years.
. Methods
After ethics review and approval, we conducted tele-
hone interviews with purposefully selected provincial
rug plan executives. In January 2012, we sent study invi-
ations to each of the ten provincial drug plans. Invitations
ere sent to the most senior executive within each plan
r, where identiﬁable, the executive responsible for con-
ract negotiations. Invitees were asked to participate in a
elephone interview or to identify an appropriate individ-
al to speak on behalf of their jurisdiction. Nine provinces
greed to participate; only one province, Newfoundland
nd Labrador, declined.
Seven of the nine policy makers interviewed had
orked with their respective drug plans for at least ﬁve
ears. The other two policy makers were hired more
ecently and speciﬁcally to manage new PLA negotiation
rocesses in their jurisdictions. All study participants from
rovinces that had used PLAs had direct experience with
LA negotiations.
Interviews were semi-structured around questions
bout the extent and nature of PLA use in each province;
erceptions about the goals and objectives for PLA use
r rationale for not using PLAs; and perceptions about
he challenges posed by PLA use in the participant’s
urisdiction or in Canada more generally if PLAs were not
eing used in the particular province. Interviews lasted an
verage of 40 min  (range 28–54 min), and were recorded
nd transcribed for thematic analysis [19]. All four authors
ead all transcripts and independently identiﬁed themes
hat emerged from the text. Authors met  and jointly
eveloped a coding scheme that then was used by two
uthors to independently code each transcript. Coding
iscrepancies were resolved through consensus or by
onsulting the lead author.
. Results
.1. Trends in the use of PLAs
Policy makers reported that PLAs involving conﬁdential
ebates to government were seldom used prior to 2006.
his is consistent with ﬁndings of previous studies that also
nvolved interviews with Canadian policymakers [16–18].
articipants in our study described isolated cases where
anufacturers offered one or more provinces PLAs prior
o 2006; some of these cases have been described in the
iterature [5,20,21]. We  were also reminded that, begin-
ing in 1998, Ontario had required that manufacturers
rovide three-year sales forecasts for new drugs as a form
f “risk-sharing” PLA. The Ontario government received lit-
le funding through these particular PLAs as they were not
egotiated agreements per se.  Manufacturers were sim-
ly required to provide sales forecasts, which government
udits found to be inexplicably high (typically far exceeding
overnment’s own estimates); moreover, governmenty 112 (2013) 248– 254
cost overruns above those sales forecasts could only be
recouped if the additional utilization was deemed inappro-
priate [22].
Changes to policy frameworks in recent years have
made PLA use a regular part of coverage decision-making
processes in ﬁve provinces. Laws or policies that would
enable routine use of PLAs were passed in Ontario in 2006,
in Manitoba and British Columbia in 2007, and in Alberta
and Saskatchewan in 2011 [23–27]. As of 2012, Ontario
and Manitoba used PLAs for virtually all new drug list-
ings on their formularies; British Columbia, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan routinely used PLAs but not for all listed
drugs; and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward
Island seldom used PLAs.
Quebec is the only province among those participating
in our study to not use PLAs as a matter of policy. As the
policy maker from Quebec explained, conﬁdential rebates
are inconsistent with the province’s policies that require
private insurers be offered any rebates that might be given
to the Quebec government [15]. Providing rebate informa-
tion to private insurance companies operating in Quebec
– many of which also sell insurance policies in the volun-
tary insurance markets other provinces – would be difﬁcult
without making the rebates public knowledge, which is
incompatible with manufacturers’ desires to keep price
concessions conﬁdential so as to avoid setting precedent
with other payers.
Policy makers were unable to disclose contract-speciﬁc
information; however, those that use PLAs said that the
majority focus on ﬁnancial terms. When asked about PLAs
used in the twelve months prior to interviews, six policy
makers reported using PLAs where rebates were a ﬁxed
percentage of list prices, while seven reported using PLAs
where rebates were a function of total expenditures or
volume of drugs used. In contrast, just two  policy mak-
ers reported using PLAs where rebates were a function
of health outcomes. The focus on ﬁnancial terms may
be explained by difﬁculties in negotiating and enforcing
health outcomes-based PLAs – a policy challenge noted by
several policymakers, as described below. All policy makers
said that they would never use a PLA if there were serious
questions about a product’s relative safety and effective-
ness.
3.2. Factors contributing to the use of PLAs
The most commonly cited driver of PLA use by Cana-
dian provinces was the perception that price negotiations
were being recommended by the CDR. Six policy mak-
ers noted that, since approximately 2009, the CDR has
occasionally recommended that provinces list a drug only
if a price reduction is secured. Policy makers believed
manufacturers were submitting CDR applications at prices
known to exceed standard cost-effectiveness thresholds
with the understanding that conﬁdential deals would sub-
sequently be negotiated. One policy maker suggested that
some provinces only use PLAs when the CDR has recom-
mended a price reduction and that, in doing so, they are
just “following the recommendation.”
Related to the perception that a new pricing paradigm
was  emerging, ﬁve policy makers said that the uncertain
S.G. Morgan et al. / Health Polic
Table 2
Frequency of theme mentions in interviews with policy makers from nine
provinces.
Factors contributing to use of PLAs Number of policy makers
that mentioned theme
(maximum possible = 9)
HTA (CDR) recommending price
negotiation
6
Uncertainty about
value-for-money
5
Manufacturer pressure,
manufacturer proposing contract
3
Public or political pressure to list
speciﬁc drugs
3
Precedent set by other jurisdictions
using contracts
3
Goals and objectives for PLA use
Managing budget impact and
ﬁnancial risk
8
Securing low prices 5
Increasing access, maximizing
formulary
5
Managing uncertainty related to
effectiveness
3
Regulating promotion of drugs by
manufacturers
2
Challenges with PLA use to date
Resource-intensive 7
Difﬁcult to enforce 6
Feeling of being gamed by
manufacturers or system
6
Lack of transparency 4
Delay, lengthy process in
negotiation of contracts
3
value-for-money of new drugs was a driving force behind
PLA use. While policy makers often used terms like “uncer-
tain” to describe their assessment of the value of new
medicines, they appeared sure that, for some drugs, avail-
able clinical data did not justify the list prices. As one policy
maker explained, “[many new drugs] are very similar to
other things that are on the market but they’re being pre-
mium priced.”
Three policy makers reported that, in addition to refus-
ing to lower list prices, manufacturers have recently begun
to actively promote PLA use. As one policy maker explained,
“usually they’re contacting us to say, ‘Can I meet to tell you
what I can do for you?’ And in most cases, it’s a PLA.” Some
policy makers used terms like “aggressive,” “pressure”, and
“push” to describe the promotion of PLAs by manufacturers.
At the same time, three policy makers also reported being
under pressure from politicians and patient groups to “ﬁnd
a way” to fund new medicines even if they did not meet
conventional standards of cost-effectiveness, particularly
in instances where the drug in question was a high-cost
medicine for rare and serious conditions. Policy mak-
ers explained that key stakeholders – including industry,
patient groups, and politicians – viewed PLAs as “the way”
or even “the only way” to resolve this tension (Table 2).
3.3. Goals and objectives for PLA useAll eight policy makers who had used a PLA in the
12 months prior to our study mentioned managing
ﬁnancial risks as an important goal of PLA use. Somey 112 (2013) 248– 254 251
policy makers said that budget predictability had become
of increased importance to governments following the
economic downturn which began in 2008. Several policy
makers also explained that PLAs can manage uncertainty
about drug utilization and the risk of declining cost-
effectiveness if drugs are prescribed more broadly than
speciﬁc indications.
Five policy makers cited PLAs as a way to secure lower
prices. Negotiating a PLA was  perceived as necessary in
order to lower the price of a drug such that it would
become “affordable” or “acceptable” according to decision-
making criteria. Several of the policy makers noted that
they face public criticism for focusing on ﬁnancial terms
either because they are “allowing ﬁrms to buy their way
onto the formulary” or because they “only care about costs.”
However, ﬁve policy makers explained that a primary rea-
son for using a PLA is to provide patients with access to
drugs that they would otherwise have to say no to.
Three policy makers said that they hoped that PLAs
could resolve clinical uncertainty by providing mecha-
nisms to tie payment to performance. These appeared to
be expressions of future aspirations as two of these policy
makers (as well as policy makers from other provinces)
perceived difﬁculties in implementing outcomes-based
PLAs. Two policy makers identiﬁed a separate but related
goal of using PLAs to regulate drug promotion, which
could help prevent utilization that is inappropriate or not
cost-effective.
3.4. Challenges with PLA use to date
Most policy makers mentioned one or more administra-
tive challenges to PLA use. Seven said resources required for
negotiations were a key challenge. Policy makers argued
that drug plans now need specialized human resources not
required before PLAs became a common tool for formulary
management. Three mentioned that the back-and-forth
of negotiations can delay funding decisions. As one pol-
icy maker explained, “it holds everything up . . . you start
working on a ﬁle and six months later, you’re still working
on the ﬁle”.
Six policy makers said that enforcing contracts was  a
major challenge. Some said ﬁrms will attempt to avoid pay-
ing negotiated rebates wherever possible, such as when
there is a dispute over sales volumes, utilization pat-
terns, or health outcomes. Several policy makers cautioned
against outcomes-based PLAs on the grounds that they are
especially difﬁcult to enforce. A related challenge, men-
tioned by six policy makers, was the risk that drug plans
can be “gamed” by manufacturers when negotiating PLAs.
One policy maker said ﬁrms often propose “innovative”
reimbursement schemes so complex they are virtually
unenforceable. Another described situations where ﬁrms
had proposed price-volume thresholds so high that gov-
ernment would never receive a rebate.
Related closely to the concerns about being gamed by
manufacturers over contract details, four policy makers
expressed concerns that the lack of transparency with PLAs
forces Canada’s public drug plans into isolated negotia-
tions. Several policy makers stated that ﬁrms were using
the secrecy of PLAs to “divide can conquer” drug plans in a
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rocess known as whipsawing: offering a price discount to
he ﬁrst jurisdiction to list a drug so that pressure is placed
n other jurisdictions to follow. One policy maker referred
o this process as “proﬁt maximization by giving away a
mall discount to some payers and keeping all the other
ecision makers in the dark.” After describing a similar pro-
ess, another policy maker concluded that “in the end the
verage price is higher: if they get into one of the markets
t a very low price, they whipsaw the other ones into high
rices.” The argument was that the political pressure cre-
ted by precedent set by having one province fund a drug
nder a secret PLA forced other provinces to fund the drug
ven at prices that would not meet conventional standards
or cost-effectiveness.
. Discussion
Through interviews with Canadian policy makers, we
ound several perceptions regarding the motivations for
nd challenges with the use of PLAs consistent with expe-
iences in other jurisdictions internationally [5,6]. Policy
akers in Canada primarily view PLAs as a mechanism to
ddress concerns about drug prices and budget stability
ather than as a pay-for-performance tool. This is in part
ecause they also view PLA negotiation and enforcement as
igniﬁcant challenges. Others have also found that success
n outcomes-based reimbursement schemes has been lim-
ted to date because it can be difﬁcult to develop evidence of
ffectiveness in real-world use that is of sufﬁcient quality to
e enforceable in a legal contract [5,6]. This does not mean
hat policy frameworks will not evolve to develop enforce-
ble contracts that address issues of uncertainty. Some
ncertainty about value for money of a new medicine can,
or example, be addressed with utilization-based contracts
herein rebates are low when a drug is used by target pop-
lations and high when it is used by other populations [28].
Because our study of PLA use by Canadian provinces
s tantamount to a comparative study involving ten juris-
ictions of different size, income, and policy experience,
e were also able to identify themes that have not yet
merged in the literature. In particular, Canadian policy
akers expressed many concerns that relate to power and
quity in PLA use and outcomes.
Several policy makers appeared to feel powerless in the
ecision to use PLAs. They felt that PLA use had been thrust
pon them by a number of forces, most of which were out
f their control: manufacturers’ new pricing tactics and
elated recommendations from the CDR; political pressures
o fund specialized drugs for rare and serious conditions
ven if not meeting conventional cost-effectiveness stan-
ards; and precedent set by other provinces’ use of PLAs. As
xplained by one policy maker, “based on what’s going on
cross the country amongst other jurisdictions you either
artake or you get left behind as far as pricing.” We  believe
hat pressures like this are common worldwide because the
istorically widespread use of cross-national price com-
arisons has led manufacturers to restrict variations in list
rices and thereby promote the use conﬁdential rebates
nder reimbursement contracts as a mechanism for price
iscrimination across payers [17,28–30].y 112 (2013) 248– 254
Beyond the choice of whether or not to use PLAs, policy
makers expressed power-related concerns about PLA nego-
tiations and enforcement, including the possibility that
payers could be manipulated or “gamed” by manufactur-
ers. Such concerns might be expected at the outset of a
paradigm shift as signiﬁcant as the move from “yes” or “no”
formulary decision-making on transparent list prices to a
system of conﬁdential negotiations over prices, utilization
patterns, and possibly even health outcomes. Over time,
however, policy frameworks can adapt to this paradigm
and allow payers to exert power in negotiations, as demon-
strated by the effective negotiation of PLAs by funders
in other countries, including those in the relatively small
jurisdiction of New Zealand [28,31].
Even with the development of effective policy frame-
works for PLA use, Canadian policy makers identiﬁed
inequities that would persist as long as Canada contin-
ues to ﬁnance prescription drugs through a multi-payer
system. Policy makers noted that negotiation outcomes
across public drug plans in Canada are a function of
both bargaining capacity and purchasing power. Across
provinces, differences in such factors can be dramatic:
for example, the public drug budget for Ontario is
nearly the size of Prince Edward Island’s entire Gross
Domestic Product: roughly CAD$4.5 billion and CAD$5.0
billion, respectively [32,33]. In addition to sheer pur-
chasing power differences, one policy maker said that
these differences in scale mean that larger provinces
have more people in their pricing divisions than smaller
provinces have running their entire drug beneﬁt pro-
grams.
Also a function of multi-payer ﬁnancing, Canadian
policy makers expressed concerns that PLA use creates
inequities across payers within provinces. Patients who are
uninsured or who must pay deductibles or co-insurance
face inﬂated list prices but do not receive rebates from
manufacturers. Private insurers are in a similar situation,
though they are better equipped than individual patients to
negotiate their own PLAs. The possibility of intra-provincial
price discrimination puts provinces in a difﬁcult position
of having to balance their ﬁnancial and access goals for the
public drug plan against the potential disparities that PLAs
may  create. Even if list price inﬂation is a function of global
pricing paradigms, some policy makers raised important
questions about the ethics of governments receiving price
rebates that uninsured and under-insured patients cannot
obtain.
5. Limitations
This study is limited by the fact that the views expressed
by interviewees represent a snapshot of policy makers’
perceptions in a complex policy arena. These percep-
tions depend on the individuals spoken with and will
change as experiences with PLAs evolve. We  are also awaresocial desirability bias. In an effort to reduce this bias,
we informed participants that attributable quotes would
only be used if essential and only after consent was pro-
vided.
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6. Conclusions
Driven largely by what policy makers perceive to be
external forces, PLAs are becoming a routine part of drug
coverage decision-making in many Canadian provinces.
Despite concerns about power and equity in PLA use and
outcomes, most provinces are, in the words of one pol-
icy maker, “coming around to the reality of having to
accept that [PLAs] are part of the current climate, and the
only way that we can achieve the best value for [our pro-
grams].”
Whether in Canada or elsewhere, adaptation to this new
pricing paradigm will require that policy makers develop
and share best practices so that they, not manufacturers,
are in control. As has occurred with health technology
assessment, policy networks should be formed to facili-
tate sharing of PLA negotiation experiences and insights
[34,35]. We  recently interviewed decisions makers from
nine high-income countries and found that best practices
may  be those based on the principles of pragmatism, dis-
cipline and transparency, and include clear and consistent
processes for negotiating contracts with relatively simple
rebate structures [28].
Attention should also be paid to inter-jurisdictional
disparities that may  arise as a result of increasing PLA
use. Globally, involvement of a body such as the World
Health Organization is likely needed to address concerns
that PLA use may  exacerbate disparities in pharmaceu-
tical prices due to the fact that negotiation outcomes
may  be as much a function of negotiating capacity
as ability-to-pay [36]. Within federations like Canada,
this will likely require a strong federal role to statin
collaborative negotiations that address interprovincial dis-
parities in negotiating capacity and bargaining power.
Finally in countries, like Canada, where there are signif-
icant numbers of under-insured and uninsured people,
expansion of pharmaceutical coverage is also needed
to protect patients from bearing undue costs associ-
ated with increasingly inﬂated list prices for drugs. For
Canada, this might involve the expansion of its ‘medi-
care’ system to include prescription drugs, which would
ensure that all patients are covered while consolidating
negotiating power in a single-payer system within each
province.
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